Introduction

An important turning point in Ghana's constitutional history was reached yesterday when President John Dramani Mahama received a 127-page Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) Report. Constitutional review is a means to redress power disparities, improve accountability, and bolster democracy and public confidence in the state.

The work of the CRC shows an admirable willingness to address persistent issues with executive authority, institutional effectiveness, and democratic practice. The clarity, consistency, and practical application of the suggested remedies, however, are what really make constitutional reform valuable. In this light, several key issues in the report warrant careful reflection and refinement to ensure lasting and meaningful change.

Independent Offices and Appointments

The CRC Report, at page 22, recommends that appointments to Independent offices should be made by the President in accordance with nominations presented by an independent constitutional body, following a competitive, merit-based recruitment and selection process administered by that body either alone or with the professional or administrative support of the Public Services Commission. Under this recommendation, the President’s role in such appointments is largely ceremonial: acting as Head of State, rather than as a political Head of Government, similar to the President’s function under the 1969 Constitution.

Following the nomination, the report proposes that Parliament should approve appointments to these Independent offices. However, this parliamentary stage poses potential challenges. If the President’s party holds a parliamentary majority that opposes the independent body’s recommendation, the approval process could become a bottleneck. A strong majority could reject, delay, or stall approval even for highly qualified nominees, thereby politicizing the office.

To address this risk, it is recommended that a time-bound approval process be established, and that Parliament be required to provide clear reasons for approval or disapproval. Such decisions should also be subject to appeal or judicial review, ensuring transparency, accountability, and protection against politicization.

Tenure and Appointment of Key Public Office Holders

The CRC Report provides that there shall be a Controller and Accountant-General, appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the Council of State, to hold office for a single, non-renewable term of eight (8) years or until attaining the age of sixty-five (65) years, whichever occurs earlier. Similar provisions are proposed for the Government Statistician and other key office holders. While these recommendations are intended to strengthen public institutions, they retain appointment arrangements that continue to expose critical offices to executive influence. Where appointments are made by, or are significantly shaped by, the President, genuine institutional independence becomes difficult to secure particularly for offices mandated to exercise oversight or accountability over the Executive. Independence is not solely a function of personal integrity; it is structurally determined by appointment processes and lines of accountability.

Furthermore, the CRC Report does not adequately justify the choice of an eight-year term as opposed to alternative options such as five- or six-year terms, or staggered tenure arrangements. In the absence of clearly defined performance benchmarks, mid-term review mechanisms, or removal procedures based on objective criteria, an extended tenure risks weakening responsiveness and reducing institutional dynamism. If long tenures are to be maintained, they must be complemented by non-partisan appointment processes, robust performance evaluation frameworks, and transparent, objective removal mechanisms.Top of Form

Timelines and Procedural Fairness in Tribunal Proceedings

A further concern arises from the inflexible sixty-day timeline imposed on the proposed tribunal, without adequate safeguards to accommodate legal interruptions. The CRC Report provides that the five-member tribunal appointed by the Council of State shall conduct its hearings in camera and submit its findings within sixty days. While fixed timelines are important to prevent undue delay, the proposal does not account for situations in which a person appearing before the tribunal initiates court proceedings, resulting in injunctions or stays of proceedings.

In such circumstances, strict adherence to a sixty-day deadline becomes both impractical and potentially unjust. Court actions being constitutionally guaranteed may lawfully suspend tribunal proceedings through no fault of the tribunal. If the sixty-day period continues to run while the tribunal is restrained from sitting, the process risks either expiring prematurely or compelling hurried and procedurally defective outcomes. The CRC Report does not clarify whether periods covered by court injunctions are to be excluded from the sixty-day calculation, nor does it provide a mechanism for the tribunal to seek an extension where circumstances so require. This omission creates legal uncertainty and exposes the process to technical challenges that could ultimately undermine the objective of timely and fair adjudication. To protect due process and preserve procedural integrity, the Constitution should expressly provide that periods during which proceedings are stayed by court order shall not be counted as part of the sixty days. Alternatively, the tribunal should be empowered, upon application and for stated reasons, to seek a limited extension of time.

Inconsistencies in Limiting Presidential Appointment Powers

The CRC’s approach to restraining presidential appointment powers remains inconsistent. While the report acknowledges the need to reduce the extensive discretionary authority of the President in public appointments, it paradoxically preserves significant appointment powers over so-called hybrid or independent offices. By vesting the appointment of key officials in these bodies solely in the President, rather than in independent institutions such as the Public Services Commission or the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), the proposed reforms risk entrenching executive influence instead of curbing it.

Genuine accountability is better achieved when appointments to regulatory and oversight institutions are insulated from political control, ensuring that office holders are accountable primarily to the public interest rather than to the appointing authority. Moreover, the CRC Report pays limited attention to critical issues such as funding autonomy, performance accountability, and protection from subtle forms of executive interference. Aside from the proposal to amend Article 179(5) to require that estimates submitted under Article 127(4) be laid before Parliament by the President without revision or alteration, these safeguards are largely unaddressed. In practice, the dominance of party loyalty, executive influence over the parliamentary majority, the risk of political pressure, and weak technical capacity should not distort the assessment of budget estimates submitted by independent bodies. For Parliament to discharge its constitutional responsibilities effectively, the evaluation of such estimates must be anchored in transparency, professional analysis, and the overarching national interest.

Presidential Tenure and Eligibility Concerns

Another troubling recommendation is the proposal to extend the presidential term to five years. Lengthening the tenure in office heightens the risk of prolonged ineffective leadership. Where an underperforming government is mistakenly elected, a longer term can compound political, economic, and social harm. The argument that a four-year term is inadequate for designing and implementing meaningful development policies is unconvincing; a longer tenure does not necessarily translate into better outcomes. Instead, it may simply extend the adverse effects of poor governance, highlighting the continued importance of accountability and regular electoral review.

In addition, the proposal to reduce the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 30 raises significant concerns. Many individuals’ complete formal education in their early twenties and may not yet have acquired the practical experience, exposure, and leadership maturity required to shoulder the complex responsibilities of the nation’s highest office. Lowering the age threshold therefore risks entrusting critical national decisions to individuals who may lack sufficient experience. A minimum age of 35 is preferable, as it strikes a balance between youthful energy and adequate experience, ensuring that presidential candidates possess the maturity, judgment, and capacity necessary for effective national leadership.

Caretaker Presidency and Constitutional Succession

The Committee’s recommendation that Cabinet should elect one of its members to serve as President for a three-month caretaker period in the event of simultaneous vacancies in the offices of President and Vice President raises serious constitutional and practical concerns. While the objective of ensuring continuity of government and avoiding institutional paralysis particularly where the Speaker of Parliament belongs to a different political party is understandable, the proposal is fundamentally flawed. The recommendation fails to define Cabinet seniority or establish clear, objective criteria for determining eligibility to serve as caretaker President. This omission creates uncertainty and opens the process to internal contestation and politicization at a critical moment of national vulnerability. Moreover, the justification for excluding the Speaker of Parliament on the basis of party affiliation elevates political convenience above constitutional principle. The Speaker’s place in the constitutional order of precedence is deliberately designed to provide a neutral and stabilizing fallback in exceptional circumstances. Departing from this established logic risks undermining the separation of powers and embedding partisan considerations into the rules of presidential succession, thereby weakening constitutional stability rather than reinforcing it.

National Development Planning and Project Continuity

Although the CRC proposes an amendment to Article 87 to enhance the coordinating and monitoring role of the National Development Planning Commission, the recommendation does not adequately address Ghana’s persistent challenge of project abandonment. By leaving implementation solely to MDAs and MMDAs, without imposing a constitutional obligation on successive governments to continue projects that are consistent with the National Development Plan, the reform strengthens planning mechanisms while failing to enforce planning discipline. In the absence of binding obligations, effective parliamentary oversight, or sanctions for non-compliance, incoming administrations remain constitutionally free to discontinue ongoing projects. This perpetuates waste, inefficiency, and policy discontinuity, undermining the very objectives of long-term national development planning.

Strengthening Asset Declaration and Accountability

One of the most commendable aspects of the CRC Report is the proposal to constitutionally empower the Auditor-General to request the assistance of the public and relevant public agencies in order to complete asset verification. To further strengthen the asset declaration regime and enhance accountability, the Constitution should expressly authorize the Auditor-General to access, verify, and cross-check information relating to the assets, liabilities, income, and financial interests of public officers, including assets that may not have been disclosed. This mandate should extend to obtaining relevant information from financial institutions, registries, regulatory bodies, citizens and other custodians of records, notwithstanding existing confidentiality laws. Where discrepancies, false declarations, or unexplained wealth are identified, the Auditor-General should be required to refer such matters for investigation and possible prosecution, subject to due process and data protection safeguards to be prescribed by Parliament.

Equally commendable is the clear timeline introduced for asset declaration. The CRC proposes that a public officer shall submit a declaration within fifteen (15) days of assuming office, thereafter at two-year intervals, and finally within thirty (30) days after the end of the officer’s term or tenure. The introduction of explicit sanctions for non-compliance with Article 286(2) further strengthens this framework and signals a serious commitment to transparency, integrity, and public accountability in public office.

Justice and Human Rights

The Constitution Review Committee’s recommendation to amend Article 33 represents a significant and commendable step toward strengthening the enforcement of fundamental human rights in Ghana. The proposed amendment broadens access to legal redress and seeks to make constitutional protections more inclusive, practical, and enforceable. One of its most notable features is the expansion of locus standing to initiate human rights applications, reflecting the reality that rights violations often affect vulnerable individuals or groups who may lack the capacity to act on their own behalf. Under the proposal, applications may be brought by individuals acting in their own interest, persons representing those unable to act for themselves, members of a group or class of persons, individuals acting in the public interest, and associations acting on behalf of their members.

The inclusion of the right to food, as captured on page 100 of the CRC Report, is also a positive development. However, prison congestion in Ghana remains a grave and persistent human rights concern that was insufficiently emphasized in the Report. Overcrowding in detention facilities exposes inmates to conditions that are degrading and inhumane, placing severe strain on sanitation and toilet infrastructure and resulting in unhygienic conditions, poor ventilation, increased exposure to disease, inadequate healthcare, and a lack of personal space and privacy. While the Report addresses certain related issues such as the right to food and the rights of the sick and vulnerable it stops short of imposing a clear constitutional obligation on the State to prevent prison overcrowding. There is no explicit requirement to ensure minimum standards of ventilation, sanitation, healthcare, and humane living conditions, nor a firm constitutional commitment to reducing congestion through measures such as non-custodial sentencing. Addressing these gaps is essential if constitutional reform is to meaningfully protect the dignity and rights of all persons deprived of their liberty.

I experienced a deep sense of satisfaction and reassurance upon reading page 98 of the CRC Report, particularly because its position aligns closely with the arguments I advanced in my article, “Remand or Punishment? An Inquiry into Ghana’s Failure to Ensure Speedy Trials (https://superlawgh.com/remand-or-punishment-an-inquiry-into-ghanas-failure-to-ensure-speedy-trials/).” The Report’s clear acknowledgment that remand should not be treated as a form of punishment affirms a fundamental principle at the core of justice and human rights.

This convergence between the CRC’s findings and the concerns articulated in my earlier work reinforces the soundness of those arguments and renews confidence that meaningful policy reform in this area is both necessary and attainable. Ultimately, page 98 of the CRC Report is uplifting because it signals genuine progress, a shared recognition that justice must be corrective, proportionate, and humane, and that deprivation of liberty before conviction should remain the exception rather than the rule.

In conclusion, although previous CRC reports were not fully implemented, it is our sincere hope that this report will translate into concrete and actionable outcomes, even in the absence of a detailed implementation plan in the CRC Report issued yesterday. We commend His Excellency, President John Mahama, for commissioning this important exercise, and we congratulate the members of the Committee for a job well done, acknowledging their dedication, diligence, and thoroughness in producing the report.

It is our hope that the insights and recommendations outlined in the CRC Report, together with the key observations highlighted in this and related articles, will be implemented to drive meaningful progress and lasting positive change for our beloved nation, Ghana. God bless our homeland Ghana and make our nation great and strong.

References

Constitutional Review Committee Report 2025

1992 Constitution of Ghana

https://citinewsroom.com/

https://www.myjoyonline.com