Recent public commentary has suggested that a person charged with a criminal offence is not under any obligation to appear before court for his trial.

With respect, this proposition does not accord with the letter or the spirit of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution.

Article 19(3) of the Constitution provides in clear and mandatory terms:

“The trial of a person charged with a criminal offence shall take place in his presence unless—
(a) he refuses to appear before the court for the trial of the offence after he has been duly notified of the trial; or
(b) he conducts himself in such a manner as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court orders him to be removed.”

The operative word is “shall.” The Constitution therefore establishes presence at trial as the norm, not as an option. The two exceptions stated in the article do not confer a right to stay away from court; rather, they deal with situations of refusal or misconduct by the accused.

In both scenarios, the absence of the accused is a result of non-compliance, not a constitutional entitlement.

The Constitution’s intention is clear: An accused person is expected to submit himself to the authority of the court and answer to the charge in person.

The allowance for trial in the absence of the accused is therefore not a relaxation of constitutional duty, but a safeguard to ensure that the administration of justice is not frustrated by defiance or disorderly conduct.

The right to a fair trial cannot be converted into a licence to evade trial.

The issue assumes even greater significance where the accused person is a former holder of high public office. Under Article 1(1) of the Constitution, the sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people. Public officers exercise authority not in their personal capacity, but as trustees of the people’s sovereign power.

By accepting public office, a person accepts the accompanying obligations of probity and accountability values expressly proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution. These are not ornamental words; they define the moral architecture of Ghana’s constitutional order.

A former Minister of State is therefore not merely “any accused person.” He is someone who once exercised delegated sovereign authority, managed public resources, and owed fiduciary duties to the people of Ghana.

To accept such office is to accept the responsibility of being called to account.

Accountability loses its meaning if those who wield public power can later decline to submit themselves to the courts of the Republic.

The Constitution has both a letter and a spirit. While Article 19(3) allows proceedings to continue where an accused person refuses to appear or misbehaves, its broader spirit demands that those who serve the public must be prepared to answer for their stewardship.

Probity and accountability are not optional virtues. They are constitutional imperatives.

Justice is not only about rights. It is also about responsibility.

By: Emmanuel Adabayeri

The author is a private legal practitioner.