In recent months, public discussion on Ghana’s economy has been dominated by the Bank of Ghana’s repeated interventions in the foreign exchange (FX) market, often in tranches of about US$10 million.

These actions are part of a broader attempt to stabilise the cedi, reduce volatility, and restore confidence among businesses, investors and the general public.

At one level, the concern is understandable. A rapidly depreciating currency affects everyone, but it hits workers and low-income households first and hardest. The moment the cedi weakens sharply, the prices of imported fuel, food items, medicines, transport services and even basic household goods rise almost immediately. For workers whose wages are adjusted only periodically, such price increases quickly erode purchasing power and living standards. From this perspective, any policy that slows depreciation or prevents sudden currency collapse appears, at least on the surface, to offer some relief.

However, macroeconomic stability must never be treated as an end in itself. The crucial question we must ask is whether the chosen path to stability is sustainable, equitable, and aligned with the broader development needs of the country, particularly the needs of workers who keep the economy running.

Foreign exchange market intermediation, even when carried out in relatively small tranches, relies on public resources. In Ghana’s case, these resources increasingly come from natural wealth, especially gold. These revenues are not private funds; they are national assets held in trust for current and future generations. Their use should therefore be guided by clear social priorities, including job creation, quality public services, and strong social protection systems.

For many Ghanaian workers, especially those in the public sector, the benefits of FX interventions are often indirect and limited. Education workers, health workers, and other public servants continue to grapple with high transport fares, rising food prices, expensive accommodation and escalating utility bills. Even during periods when the cedi appears relatively stable, the cost of living rarely retreats in a meaningful way. Once prices rise, they tend to stay high.

In the education sector, these pressures are compounded by persistent institutional challenges. Many schools and tertiary institutions face delayed budget releases, inadequate infrastructure, and shortages of essential logistics. Laboratories lack equipment, hostels are overcrowded, and administrative staff work under strained conditions. When significant public resources are channelled into defending the currency, without a corresponding increase in direct investment in education, workers and students alike are short-changed.

There is also a serious question of sustainability. Continuous reliance on FX injections exposes the economy to future shocks. Commodity prices are volatile, and external conditions can change rapidly. If inflows weaken or reserves come under pressure, the adjustment could be sudden and severe. History, both in Ghana and elsewhere, shows that such adjustments often lead to sharp inflation, cuts in public spending, job losses and renewed austerity. In these moments, workers and the poor are asked to “tighten their belts” even further, despite having had little say in the policies that created the vulnerability.

Another concern that deserves honest attention is opportunity cost. Every US$10 million used to stabilise the foreign exchange market is US$10 million not invested directly in productive sectors of the economy. That same amount could support vocational training, rehabilitate schools, equip hospitals, expand local food production, or create employment opportunities for young people. In an economy where unemployment and underemployment remain widespread, particularly among the youth, these alternatives cannot be dismissed lightly.

There is also a distributional dimension to FX interventions that is often overlooked. Those who benefit most directly tend to be large importing firms, financial institutions and consumers with higher purchasing power. Informal workers, small traders and rural households, on the other hand, often experience little immediate benefit. Prices may stabilise temporarily, but incomes do not rise correspondingly, and social support remains inadequate. Without deliberate policy design, such interventions risk reinforcing existing inequalities between rich and poor, urban and rural, formal and informal.

None of this is to suggest that government and the central bank should remain passive in the face of macroeconomic instability. A disorderly collapse of the cedi would indeed be catastrophic, particularly for vulnerable households. Limited, targeted and carefully managed interventions may therefore be justified during periods of acute stress. But emergency measures should remain exactly that: temporary responses to exceptional circumstances, not permanent features of economic management.

The deeper challenge facing Ghana is structural. For decades, the economy has depended heavily on primary commodity exports and imports of finished goods. This structure makes the currency inherently vulnerable and places persistent pressure on foreign exchange reserves. No amount of short-term market intervention can substitute for the hard work of diversifying exports, adding value to raw materials, strengthening domestic manufacturing, and reducing import dependence.

Workers have a direct stake in these reforms. A diversified and productive economy creates more and better jobs, improves wages, and reduces vulnerability to external shocks. It also provides a stronger and more sustainable basis for currency stability. In this sense, protecting the cedi and protecting workers should not be competing goals, they should be mutually reinforcing.

Transparency and social dialogue are essential in this process. Workers, through organised labour, have a legitimate interest in understanding how macroeconomic decisions are made and what trade-offs they involve. Regular, structured engagement between economic managers and labour organisations can help build trust, improve policy design, and ensure that workers’ perspectives are taken seriously. Macroeconomic policy should not be the preserve of technocrats alone; it has real consequences for people’s lives.

Protecting workers’ real incomes also requires complementary wage policies. FX market interventions, even when successful, do not automatically safeguard purchasing power. Wage-setting mechanisms must include provisions such as cost-of-living adjustments, inflation-linked reviews or timely renegotiations. Without these, workers remain exposed to the inevitable imperfections and delays of macroeconomic stabilisation.

Ultimately, Ghana’s economic policy choices must be judged by their impact on ordinary people. Teachers, cleaners, laboratory technicians, administrators, nurses, artisans and traders are not abstract variables in an economic model. They are citizens whose labour sustains the nation. Policies that stabilise markets but leave workers struggling to survive cannot be considered successful.

Ghana’s challenges are complex, and there are no quick or painless solutions. But one principle should remain clear and non-negotiable: economic stability must serve human development, not the other way around. Currency stability is important, but it should never be pursued at the expense of decent work, social justice and long-term national transformation.

If this moment of relative calm in the currency market is used wisely, to invest in productive capacity, strengthen public services, and deepen social protection, then the sacrifices made may yet yield lasting benefits. If not, we risk repeating a familiar cycle of short-term relief followed by deeper crisis.

The choice before us is therefore not simply about defending the cedi today, but about building an economy that works for Ghanaian workers today, tomorrow and for generations to come.