The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) has proposed wide-ranging changes to Ghana’s 1992 Constitution aimed at reducing presidential powers, strengthening Parliament and the Judiciary, deepening local democracy and improving accountability in public institutions.

In a press statement issued on Wednesday, September 2, 2026, the Institute outlined its position on 18 key areas arising from the report of the Constitution Review Committee, chaired by Prof H. Kwasi Prempeh, and the government’s subsequent position paper.

While supporting several recommendations of the Prempeh Committee, the IEA rejected proposals to extend the terms of the President and Members of Parliament to five years, allow the President to nominate candidates for MMDCE elections and establish a state-funded Democracy Fund for the non-electioneering activities of political parties.

It also challenged the government’s rejection or modification of recommendations concerning judicial appointments, the Council of State, national development planning and the separation of ministers from Parliament.

Below are the 18 key positions advanced by the Institute.

1. Protecting Ghana’s democratic gains

The IEA began by acknowledging the contribution of the 1992 Constitution to Ghana’s democratic stability.

It noted that the Constitution, the country’s longest-serving, had provided the framework for nine Parliaments, five Presidents and four peaceful transfers of power from governing parties to opposition parties.

However, the Institute said persistent gaps, ambiguities, weak institutions and the concentration of excessive powers in the Executive justified the demand for constitutional reform.

It said the review must be guided by a clear national vision and an institutional structure capable of delivering accountable, effective and democratic governance.

2. IEA’s involvement in constitutional reform

The Institute also highlighted its longstanding role in the constitutional reform process, including its contribution to the work of the 2011 Fiadjoe Constitutional Review Commission.

It said it continued to advocate reform after the first major review process stalled and established the Oquaye Centre for Constitutional Studies in 2022 to promote public discussions on the Constitution.

The IEA subsequently engaged the Prempeh Committee and submitted a detailed report containing its recommendations.

3. Assessment of committee report and government position

The Institute said its current position followed a careful assessment of the Prempeh Committee’s report and the government’s response to its recommendations.

It explained that its proposals were intended to preserve the democratic gains made under the Constitution while correcting structural weaknesses that had emerged over more than three decades.

4. Reducing the President’s appointment powers

On presidential appointments, the Prempeh Committee proposed classifying public offices as executive, independent, hybrid-independent or hybrid-executive. The President’s level of discretion would vary according to the classification of each office.

It also recommended competitive appointments to independent institutions, wider institutional participation in nominations and terms of office that would not be tied to the President’s tenure.

Although the government accepted the need for greater checks, it rejected the four-tier classification and proposed working with the Constitution Review Implementation Committee on an alternative framework.

The IEA supported the Committee’s fundamental objective, arguing that the reviewed Constitution must contain detailed provisions that would substantially reduce the President’s “overwhelming appointing powers”.

It said appointments to public offices must be inclusive and based on merit.

5. Rejecting five-year terms for President and MPs

The IEA rejected the recommendation to extend the terms of the President and MPs from four to five years.

The Prempeh Committee proposed the extension, and the government accepted it on the grounds that it would give elected officials more time to formulate, implement and assess policies.

“The IEA disagrees. Four years is sufficient for an elected government to implement its programme,” the Institute stated.

It maintained that the tenure of elected officials should not be extended without “cogent and compelling evidence” that the existing mandate was inadequate.

6. Reforming judicial appointments

The Prempeh Committee proposed a structured, multi-stage process for appointing the Chief Justice and other Superior Court judges.

The process would include public advertisements, shortlisting, interviews, the nomination of multiple candidates and parliamentary approval.

The government rejected the proposal, arguing that the existing constitutional arrangement adequately balanced merit, executive responsibility, judicial independence and parliamentary oversight.

The IEA, however, called for the Judicial Council to be reformed into an independent body responsible for judicial appointments.

It said this would improve transparency, protect the structural independence of the Judiciary and ensure independent input into the selection of all judicial officers, including the Chief Justice.

7. Capping the number of Supreme Court judges

The IEA supported the principle of placing a constitutional limit on the number of Supreme Court judges but said the figure must be linked to the Court’s jurisdiction and caseload.

The Prempeh Committee recommended a maximum of 15 judges, with some appeals terminating at the Court of Appeal, while the government proposed a cap of 19.

According to the Institute, an unlimited or excessively large Supreme Court could create institutional uncertainty.

It said a cap of 19—or any other number—could only be justified if the Court’s appellate jurisdiction was reduced, allowing it to concentrate on constitutional matters and cases of exceptional legal importance.

8. Clarifying the removal of Superior Court judges

The IEA described the existing constitutional provisions governing the removal of Superior Court judges, particularly the Chief Justice, as “too sketchy and susceptible to political manipulation”.

The Prempeh Committee proposed detailed rules covering petitions, the preliminary determination of a prima facie case, suspension, tribunals and timelines.

Although the government agreed that greater clarity was necessary, it preferred to address the issue through subsidiary legislation or procedural rules.

The IEA called for Article 146 to be amended to state the procedures directly in the Constitution, drawing on international standards such as Kenya’s judicial removal framework.

It also proposed an intermediate disciplinary system to sanction judicial misconduct that might not be serious enough to warrant removal from office.

9. Opening MMDCE elections to all qualified citizens

The Institute supported the election of all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives but rejected the government’s proposal for the President to nominate candidates.

Under the government’s model, candidates would be selected from five people nominated by the President and subsequently shortlisted by a vetting committee.

The Prempeh Committee had proposed a phased election system based on the financial and administrative capacity of individual districts.

The IEA said every qualified citizen should be allowed to contest MMDCE elections through a non-partisan process.

“Local-level democracy will be strengthened when citizens, rather than the President, determine who may stand for election to lead in the district,” it said.

10. Separating ministerial appointments from Parliament

The IEA backed the Prempeh Committee’s recommendation to prevent MPs from simultaneously serving as ministers, deputy ministers or regional ministers.

The government rejected the proposal, arguing that the President should retain the discretion to appoint ministers from within or outside Parliament.

The Institute said separating Parliament from the Executive would strengthen parliamentary independence and oversight.

“Parliament cannot be expected to provide robust scrutiny of Government while a significant proportion of its members simultaneously depend on presidential appointment for executive office,” it stated.

11. Barring politicians from SOE boards

The IEA also supported a constitutional prohibition preventing ministers, deputy ministers and MPs from serving on the boards of state-owned enterprises.

The government wants the matter addressed through ordinary legislation, but the Institute said constitutional protection was necessary to prevent recurring political interference.

It argued that the governance of state-owned enterprises should be driven by competence, professionalism, independence and accountability rather than political affiliation.

12. Rejecting a state-funded Democracy Fund

The Institute rejected the proposed use of public funds to finance the non-electioneering activities of political parties.

The Prempeh Committee proposed a Democracy Fund administered by an Independent Registrar and Regulator of Political Parties and Campaigns. The government accepted the proposal in principle but preferred to establish it through legislation.

While opposing broad state funding, the IEA said limited and clearly defined assistance could be provided for specific activities.

It cited the possibility of the state paying the Electoral Commission to supervise internal party elections if the political party delegate system were abolished.

13. Restructuring the Council of State

The IEA backed the proposal to restructure the Council of State to provide wider institutional representation.

The Prempeh Committee proposed a 33-member body representing Parliament, traditional authorities, agriculture, industry and commerce, organised labour, faith-based organisations, professional associations, academia and civil society, alongside elected regional representatives.

The government rejected the proposal, arguing that the present arrangement provided an appropriate balance and limited executive control.

The IEA disagreed, saying the existing system effectively allowed the President to choose his own principal advisers.

It proposed institutional representation modelled on the traditional councils of chiefs, alongside representatives elected from the regions.

14. Establishing a binding national development plan

The Institute supported an independent National Development Planning Commission with the authority to formulate binding long-term development plans.

The Prempeh Committee proposed that the Commission should coordinate, monitor and evaluate a binding national plan, while implementation would remain with ministries, departments, agencies and local assemblies.

The government rejected the proposal, arguing that it could transfer executive functions to unelected technocrats and restrict the policy choices of future governments.

The IEA said the tenure of the Commission’s members should not coincide with that of the President. It also proposed that political party manifestoes should be required to reflect the approved national development plan.

“Instead of repeatedly resetting Ghana’s development agenda with every change of government, a credible long-term national development framework can provide continuity,” it said.

15. Constitutionalising lifestyle and wealth audits

The IEA supported proposals to investigate unexplained increases in the wealth of public officials through lifestyle and wealth audits.

The Prempeh Committee recommended strengthening Article 286(4) through stricter asset declaration deadlines and a reverse burden of proof, subject to appropriate safeguards.

While the government preferred to address the proposals through legislation, the Institute called for them to be entrenched in the Constitution.

“The fight against corruption requires more than general principles; it requires clear, enforceable and credible constitutional obligations that cannot be easily amended,” it stated.

The IEA said a stronger asset declaration regime would provide a more timely basis for detecting and addressing illicit enrichment by public officeholders.

16. Increasing representation of women and marginalised groups

The Institute described proposals from both the government and the Prempeh Committee for increasing the representation of women and marginalised groups as “grossly insufficient”.

The government has proposed capping Parliament at 300 members, comprising 276 constituency representatives and 24 additional members elected through proportional representation.

The additional seats would be reserved for women, persons with disabilities and young people, subject to a feasibility study.

The IEA called for a broader proportional representation system under which political parties would nominate women and members of other marginalised groups based on their share of votes in an election.

It also proposed mandatory quotas and other measures to ensure that all public institutions achieve at least 30 per cent representation for each gender and other identified groups.

On District Assemblies, the Institute supported restructuring the appointed membership through quotas for women, traditional authorities, businesses, persons with disabilities, young people and non-governmental organisations.

17. Raising concerns about the amendment timeline

The IEA expressed “serious reservations” about the government’s proposed methodology and timeline for amending the Constitution.

The government plans to introduce separate amendment bills for entrenched and non-entrenched provisions. It is targeting February 2027 for the non-entrenched amendments and intends to hold a referendum on the entrenched provisions alongside the 2027 District Assembly elections.

The Institute described the approach as problematic, saying a reform exercise of such magnitude required adequate time for public education, national debate, consultation and consensus-building.

“Constitution-making must necessarily be consultative,” it said, adding that each proposed amendment must be carefully assessed before it is approved.

18. Calling for nationally owned constitutional reform

Concluding its statement, the IEA called for a principled, comprehensive and nationally owned reform process.

It said the ultimate objective should be to limit excessive executive power, strengthen Parliament and the Judiciary, deepen local democracy, professionalise state institutions, ensure continuity in national development planning and improve accountability.

“The task before the nation is to preserve what works, correct what does not, and build institutions capable of serving Ghana beyond individual Presidents, governments and political parties,” the Institute stated.

It maintained that the reform process should deliver a stronger democracy, a more accountable government and a state capable of advancing Ghana’s long-term interests.

Below is the full statement by IEA.