The Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) decision to publicly declare former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta wanted again, complete with an Interpol Red Notice, has drawn sharp criticism from private legal practitioner Amanda Clinton.

While acknowledging the legal appropriateness of an Interpol notification in such circumstances, Ms Clinton argues that the publicity surrounding the declaration could be potentially counterproductive to the OSP's own objectives.

Speaking today, Friday, June 6, 2025, on the JoyNews AM Show in response to the OSP's re-issuance of the Red Notice after Ofori-Atta missed his June 2 deadline, Ms Clinton, the Head of Chambers at Clinton Consultancy, highlighted a crucial distinction between legal procedure and strategic execution.

According to Clinton, although INTERPOL Red Notices are legitimate law enforcement tools, the decision by Ghanaian authorities to request a public notice rather than a confidential one may have compromised the element of surprise, a key advantage when attempting to intercept a fugitive at borders or in foreign jurisdictions.

“A Red Notice is primarily for law enforcement agencies around the world—not the general public,” Clinton emphasised. “If Ghana genuinely wanted help in locating and apprehending him, the Red Notice could have been listed as confidential. This way, only international law enforcement would be alerted, and he could be quietly intercepted without tipping him off,” She argued.

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Her core argument centres on the operational effectiveness of Red Notices, particularly concerning high-profile individuals.

"The real purpose of a red notice is a high-net-worth individual taking a private jet or a commercial plane somewhere and then just being nabbed because there is a silent red notice as to this being a person to be picked up," Ms Clinton explained.

She emphasised that a significant number of Interpol Red Notices are designed to be covert, allowing for discreet apprehension when an individual crosses borders.

According to Ms Clinton, the OSP's public announcement could have inadvertently "compromised an international operation potentially, which could have netted you that same individual to be picked up on the border going to [Canne] or wherever."

She suggested that such public declarations, while generating media attention, might actually hinder the quiet, efficient process of international law enforcement cooperation that often relies on stealth.

While acknowledging the argument that public wanted lists can lead to citizen tip-offs (as seen in movies and real-life cases where ordinary citizens identify suspects), Ms Clinton maintained that for an individual of Ofori-Atta's stature, apprehension typically involves formal diplomatic channels and direct notification to relevant authorities.

Ms Clinton also delved into the complexities of extradition as she pointed out that the requesting country must provide "sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case".

Crucially, she highlighted the "political offence exception" in such treaties, which "excludes extradition for offences deemed political in nature".

This, she suggested, could potentially be leveraged by Ofori-Atta's legal team, depending on how the government frames the charges, adding another layer of legal intricacy to the public pursuit.

Ultimately, Ms Clinton cautioned against the perils of what she termed a "trial by media", where public declarations might "soil people's names publicly" before due legal process can fully unfold.

While conceding it would be "better that he came back and faced these charges", her critique focuses squarely on the OSP's public relations strategy versus the more subtle, yet often more effective, tools of international law enforcement.

Ms Clinton further pointed out that Ofori-Atta’s lawyers had submitted medical documentation from the Mayo Clinic, suggesting possible cancer detection.

She was of the view that if Ghanaian law enforcement was already aware of his location, including his presence in the United States for medical treatment, then the purpose of the Red Notice may not have been to locate him but to build political momentum or apply public pressure.

“It’s plausible that the Office of the Special Prosecutor opted for a public listing to demonstrate accountability,” she noted. “But from a strategic standpoint, if the goal was to arrest him quickly—say, at a border or during travel—a confidential notice would’ve been far more effective.”

The case has reignited debates about how Ghana handles high-level corruption investigations and the balance between public transparency and operational strategy.

As the story unfolds, the effectiveness of the public listing will likely be measured not just by public perception but by whether or not Mr Ofori-Atta is brought back to Ghana to face investigation.