In most constitutional systems, prosecutorial power is vested in a public authority, usually the Attorney-General.

But does that mean one office must control all prosecutions?

Let us travel.

In Morrison v. Olson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the appointment of an independent counsel with full prosecutorial powers. Not under the Attorney-General’s daily control. Not within the usual chain. Still constitutional. The monopoly theory failed.

In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, the Indian Supreme Court went further. Independence was not optional. It was required. Because the executive cannot be trusted to investigate itself. The answer was structural insulation.

In Glenister v. President of South Africa, the Court confirmed that Parliament may create and relocate anti-corruption and prosecutorial functions. The Constitution does not freeze power in one office. What matters is independence and effectiveness.

Across constitutional democracies, prosecutorial power is vested. It is not monopolised. It is structured. It is adapted. It is insulated where necessary.

Now return home.

We are told Article 88 creates an imperial AG. That all prosecution must pass through one political office.

That Parliament is powerless to design independent institutions to fight corruption.

Even if it is obvious that a political AG cannot effectively prosecute political corruption, we are urged to interpret the Constitution as an instrument of paralysis, tying our hands and sentencing us to spectatorship while corruption thrives.

No serious constitutional system ties the fight against corruption to the discretion of a single political office.

Certainly, in light of its emphasis on probity and accountability, it takes extraordinary chutzpah to suggest that the Constitution was written to protect corruption by disabling the State.