In early July 2026, Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, met his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in Niamey. Their communiqué welcomed Russian military support, including help for the Alliance of Sahel States' new Unified Force. Only weeks earlier, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the al-Qaeda-aligned coalition, had attacked Niamey's international airport and the adjoining military complex, which also hosts the force's headquarters. Niger said 11 soldiers and two civilians were killed.

The sequence captured the Central Sahel's security paradox. Three military governments have removed French troops, dismantled much of their Western security cooperation, left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and brought Russia into a far larger role. They have gained the freedom to reject former partners and build new institutions. Yet a change in uniforms, suppliers and diplomatic language is not the same as a change in security outcomes.

This breakaway order joins counter-insurgency with freedom from French influence, collective protection for military-led states and regional leadership outside ECOWAS. It has created room for Sahelian choice. So far, it has strengthened government control over foreign and defence policy more clearly than it has protected civilians, restored territory or rebuilt accountable civilian rule.

A breakaway order born of security failure

The coups followed a shared political logic. Mali's armed forces removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2020, then Colonel Assimi Goïta, now a General, seized authority again in May 2021. Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022, first in January and then in September, when Captain Ibrahim Traoré displaced Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. In Niger, General Abdourahamane Tchiani overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023.

Each takeover drew legitimacy from the same indictment: elected leaders, foreign troops and regional institutions had failed to stop jihadist expansion. ECOWAS answered Niger's coup with sanctions and a threat of force, then lifted its main sanctions in February 2024. The three juntas framed the confrontation as a shared grievance.

The indictment resonated because the old arrangement had been extensive. France launched Operation Serval in Mali in January 2013, helping retake northern towns from jihadist groups. Its successor, Operation Barkhane, spread across the region and had 5,100 French personnel by mid-2021. European special forces served through Task Force Takuba, and the European Union trained Malian forces. The United States based surveillance drones at Air Base 201 near Agadez, a facility that cost more than $100 million, and maintained close to 1,000 personnel in Niger. The UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA, deployed close to 13,000 peacekeepers before its closure.

This architecture won battles and supplied intelligence, transport and finance that Sahelian armies lacked. It failed to establish durable state authority or public confidence. Mobile targeting coexisted with weak administration, abusive forces, local disputes and exclusion. MINUSMA had a stabilisation and protection mandate, not Barkhane's combat mission, but public debate often conflated them into a single failing foreign presence. France's colonial history, civilian harm, disputed choices and seemingly permanent bases gave anti-French politics firm local roots. Russian information campaigns circulated and amplified anti-French claims; they do not account for the anger's local origins.

The departures then came in quick succession. France completed its withdrawal from Mali in August 2022, ended its operation in Burkina Faso in February 2023 and withdrew its last troops from Niger in December 2023. Mali requested MINUSMA's termination; the mission closed by the end of 2023. The EU training mission in Mali ended in May 2024. The final US troops left Niger later that year.

The replacement institution began with the Liptako-Gourma Charter of 16 September 2023. It created the Alliance of Sahel States, formerly the French Alliance des États du Sahel and known by the initials AES, based on mutual defence: an attack on one member's sovereignty or territory would require assistance from the others. In July 2024, the three leaders created the Confederation of Sahel States, or Confederation AES, with ambitions for coordinated defence and foreign policy. They formally ceased to be members of ECOWAS on 29 January 2025.

The AES is now more than protest diplomacy. A force announced at 5,000 troops in January 2025 was launched as the Unified Force in December, with headquarters in Niamey and a stated strength of 6,000 for 2026. Members have agreed to a 0.5 per cent levy on imports from outside the confederation to support common projects. Some cross-border operations have taken place. Public evidence still does not show that the force has 6,000 deployable troops, a tested common command, dependable air support or the intelligence network needed to match its declared mission.

That gap recalls the former G5 Sahel Joint Force, created in 2017 by the three AES countries, Chad and Mauritania. It conducted 25 operations but suffered from uncertain financing, uneven command, limited aircraft and weak intelligence. The AES has firmer political cohesion and a narrower membership. It also inherits many of the same material constraints while losing access to several Western and multilateral support systems.

Russia after Wagner

Russia's role differs across the three states. Mali formed the deepest combat partnership. Wagner personnel arrived in late 2021, supporting Malian operations, training forces and supplying regime protection. Burkina Faso and Niger developed Russian ties later, with smaller contingents centred more on training, equipment and protection. All three have also bought or sought equipment from Türkiye, China, Iran and other suppliers. The new order is Russia-centred in key areas, but it is not a closed Moscow bloc.

Wagner's record in Mali combined battlefield support with grave allegations of abuse. A UN investigation found strong indications that Malian troops and foreign military personnel killed more than 500 people during an operation in Moura in March 2022. Mali rejected that account. After Wagner announced its departure in June 2025, Africa Corps remained.

That was an organisational transfer, not a Russian exit. Africa Corps was established with support from the Russian Defence Ministry after the 2023 Wagner mutiny, bringing the partnership closer to formal state command. Former Wagner personnel reportedly supplied much of its workforce. The shift makes it harder to distance Russian state responsibility from conduct on the ground.

The transition to Africa Corps did not reduce Russia’s role to training and instruction. In July 2026, Human Rights Watch said Malian forces and Africa Corps had carried out indiscriminate air strikes in Kyrnia the previous month, killing eight civilians, including three children. Africa Corps called the target a terrorist gathering; Reuters could not independently verify either account. The dispute exposes an accountability problem: the command relationship is more state-linked, while public scrutiny of operations remains slight.

The Russian relationship gives the juntas assets that Western governments became less willing to provide after coups: combat support without electoral conditions, political backing in international forums, and a narrative of sovereign equality. It also concentrates reliance on another foreign military system. A partnership can expand freedom of choice at the moment of entry, yet reduce future room to manoeuvre if equipment, training, maintenance, and elite protection come from a single source.

When Ukraine's war reached Mali

The July 2024 fighting near Tinzaouaten showed how far external rivalry could travel. Tuareg-led forces and JNIM both reported attacks on a Malian and Wagner convoy in northern Mali; the extent of coordination remains unclear. The convoy suffered severe losses. Reuters later verified video showing at least 47 bodies and identified 23 missing Russians, but that did not establish the full toll or which group caused each death.

Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukrainian military intelligence, said Malian rebels had received the information needed for a successful operation. Mali accused Ukraine of supporting terrorism and severed diplomatic relations; Niger followed. Ukraine denied involvement. A spokesman for the Tuareg-led coalition also denied receiving foreign help. Later reporting by Le Monde, based on several sources, described Ukrainian training links with the rebels, while Kyiv denied supplying drones. No public evidence has established what direct assistance, if any, Ukraine provided in the Tinzaouaten battle itself.

The evidence supports a larger conclusion. A war centred on Europe affected combat narratives, intelligence claims and diplomatic relations in the Sahel, where Russian personnel were already fighting. The episode suggests that Moscow and Kyiv now contest each other's interests beyond Europe. Calling this the internationalisation of the Russian-Ukraine conflict captures military assistance, rival narratives and client-like ties. It also hides too much. Today's field is multipolar; Türkiye, China and Gulf states have distinct roles. JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) are armed actors with local agendas, not proxies for Moscow or Western capitals. The three juntas make choices rooted in their own institutional interests. Cold War language is useful as a warning about internationalised conflict, not as a full map of it.

Sovereignty for whom?

The domestic political record tests the meaning of security sovereignty. Mali dissolved political parties in May 2025 and revised its transition charter in July to grant Goïta a renewable five-year presidential term, with no election date. Burkina Faso extended its transition by five years from July 2024, dissolved its electoral commission in 2025 and abolished political parties in January 2026. In April, Traoré told citizens to “forget democracy”. Niger's March 2025 charter set a flexible five-year transition, installed Tchiani as president and dissolved political parties. Ousted president Bazoum remained in detention three years after the coup.

Across the three states, journalists, activists and political opponents have also faced detention, enforced conscription, media suspension or closure. These measures do not prove that every security partnership is designed mainly for repression. They do show that expanded military cooperation has coincided with fewer institutions able to examine defence agreements, civilian casualties or transition pledges. Regime security and national security overlap when leaders face the risk of assassination or a coup. They separate when elite protection, political closure and coercive operations take precedence over civilian safety.

Popular support deserves equal care. In an Afrobarometer survey conducted in Mali in December 2024, 87 per cent of respondents said the AES reflected national interests; 88 per cent rated Russia's influence positively, compared with 9 per cent for France. This is strong evidence of opinion in Mali at that moment, not a mandate from all three societies or proof that Russian support delivers better security. Anti-French feeling, approval of Russia and anger at domestic insecurity are related but distinct attitudes.

The outcome test

The Global Terrorism Index recorded a marked fall in terrorism deaths during 2025: Burkina Faso fell from 1,532 to 846, Niger from 944 to 703, and Mali from 590 to 341. Yet the index counts violence attributed to non-state terrorists, not killings by state forces or allied militias. In Burkina Faso, deaths among police and military personnel rose from 419 to 643 even as civilian deaths classified as terrorism fell.

ACLED data supply the missing side of the ledger. In 2025, Burkina Faso's military and its Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland were linked to 523 civilian deaths, against 339 attributed to JNIM and ISSP. In Mali, state forces and Russian partners were linked to 918 civilian deaths, against 232 attributed to the two main jihadist organisations. These are event-data estimates, subject to reporting gaps, but they prevent a fall in one category from being mistaken for general security improvement.

The broader trend remains severe. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies recorded 9,928 reported deaths linked to militant Islamist violence across the Sahel in the 12 months ending in mid-2026. UN humanitarian reporting counted 2.8 million internally displaced people across Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger in mid-2026, including 2.1 million in Burkina Faso. Renewed coordinated attacks in Burkina Faso, multi-front assaults in Mali and two attacks on Niamey's airport complex during 2026 show that armed groups retain reach, adaptation and initiative.

There have been local military gains, and the 2025 fall in recorded terrorist deaths should not be dismissed. The evidence does not yet tie that decline securely to Russian assistance or the AES. Nor does it show sustained recovery of state administration across contested rural areas. Security-partner realignment is established; security improvement remains partial, uneven and methodologically disputed.

Regional division raises the cost of that uncertainty. Jihadist networks exploit borderlands linking the AES states with Benin, Togo and Nigeria, while Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire reinforce their northern approaches. Recent declines in militant-linked deaths in Benin and Togo show that local containment is possible, but the threat remains transnational. ECOWAS has kept travel and trade arrangements open for AES citizens. At a Senegal forum in April 2026, AES representatives left room for practical dialogue even as they accused neighbours and foreign states of aiding militants without supplying public evidence. ECOWAS is pursuing a separate regional force. Accusations, rival force projects and broken trust obstruct shared intelligence and mediation. West Africa cannot contain a mobile insurgency if institutional separation becomes operational isolation.

The AES has achieved something its critics should acknowledge: its members have acted on widespread dissatisfaction, ended unwanted deployments and built a common platform rather than waiting for outside design. Agency is not the same as capacity, and sovereignty is not measured by the flag on an adviser's sleeve. It rests on forces able to protect communities, institutions able to account for their conduct, governments able to survive public scrutiny and neighbours able to cooperate across political divides.

The decisive contest is no longer France against Russia. It is between a realignment that builds transferable Sahelian capacity and one that exchanges an old dependence for a more permissive sponsor. Unless the AES can turn partner choice into civilian protection, territorial administration and an eventual return to accountable rule, it will have remade the region's geopolitics without resolving the security failure that made the remaking possible.

Selected references

1. Institute for Economics & Peace. (2026). Global terrorism index 2026: Measuring the impact of terrorism. Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2026
2. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2026, August 12). Mounting fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa amid shifting tactics. Africa Center for Strategic Studies analysis
3. Daoura, L. S., & Salia, R. L. (2026, March 4). Will the AES Unified Force succeed where the G5 Sahel failed? Institute for Security Studies. Institute for Security Studies article
4. Lebedev, F., Crowe, P., Miridzhanian, A., Lewis, D., & Diallo, T. (2025, June 6). Africa Corps to stay in Mali after Russia’s Wagner mercenary group leaves. Reuters. Reuters report
5. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2023, May 12). Rapport sur les évènements de Moura du 27 au 31 mars 2022 [Report on the events in Moura from 27 to 31 March 2022]. United Nations. UN Moura report

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The writer can be reached via email at goodynorsah@gmail.com