The National Schools Inspectorate Authority (NaSIA) was established by the Education Regulatory Bodies Act, 2020 (Act 1023), as Ghana’s independent quality assurance institution for pre-tertiary education.

Before 2020, it operated as the National Inspectorate Board under the Education Act, 2008 (Act 778).

Operating under the Ministry of Education, NaSIA is mandated to conduct school inspections and evaluations; set and enforce standards; license all public and private pre-tertiary schools; publish performance reports; support school improvement; and, where necessary, recommend closure of institutions that fall below minimum requirements.

However, nearly 18 years since its establishment, stakeholder consultations and reviews of performance reports, policy documents and institutional reports point to major governance gaps and operational independence.

These shortcomings limit NaSIA’s ability to regulate impartially and weaken the credibility of Ghana’s education quality assurance system.

Key Issues:
1. A credible national schools inspectorate must be visibly independent, professionally insulated, and structurally empowered to hold all schools (public and private) to the same standards. However, a review of Act 1023 1 and NaSIA’s governance arrangements reveals significant weaknesses that undermine the Authority’s operational independence, with direct implications for fairness, accountability, and public trust
a. NaSIA operates as an agency under the Ministry of Education rather than as an autonomous accountability institution.
b. Executive dominance is embedded in the composition of NaSIA’s Board. Under Section 90 (2), the President appoints the Chairperson and all remaining members of the Board, giving the Executive arm extensive control over the Body that is meant to independently evaluate school quality.
c. Six (6) of the 11 Board members are either direct appointees of the Executive or directly represent the interests of Executive appointees. These include the Chairperson, the Inspector General of Schools, and representatives from the National Teaching Council, the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment, the Ghana Technical and Vocational Education and Training Service, and the Ghana Education Service.

Only the representatives of Private Schools, Teacher Associations, the West African Examinations Council, the Female Educationist and Special Education Expert (both nominated by the Minister for Education) fall outside the Executive’s direct influence.

The concentration of Executive-aligned members limits the Board’s independence and narrows the diversity of perspectives needed for impartial oversight.
d. Section 99 grants the Minister significant regulatory authority, including oversight of standards and the power to make decisions that would ordinarily fall within the remit of an independent inspectorate. This further embeds Executive influence in processes that should be professionally and operationally insulated
e. Section 89 (3) reinforces this dependence by requiring NaSIA to consult the Minister before recommending temporary or permanent school closures, creating opportunities for political involvement in decisions that should be based solely on evidence of non-compliance.

The aforementioned governance arrangements create a fundamental tension at the core of NaSIA’s mandate. Although the Authority is required under Section 92 to independently evaluate all schools, it is structurally situated within the very Ministry whose institutions, among others, it must regulate. This arrangement weakens its independence and gives rise to a perceived conflict of interest

2. NaSIA is expected to enforce standards in public schools, including those directly under the minister’s oversight, yet under Section 99 the Minister, acting on the advice of a Board appointed and dominated by the Executive, retains authority over key regulatory decisions such as school closures. Because these decisions must pass through a Board shaped by Executive appointment, and the Act also requires consultation with the Ministry at multiple stages, NaSIA’s regulatory actions are exposed to political influence.

This governance design limits the Authority’s ability to act impartially, constrains its operational independence, and ultimately undermines confidence in the fairness and credibility of its decisions

3. In the past 15 years, the number of schools under trees in the public sector increased from 3,000 to 5,000. While schools under trees do not meet the minimum standards of NaSIA, none has led to any sanction by NaSIA.

Many other schools, including those without a single desk in some classrooms, forcing students to lay on the floor, continue to escape any form of regulatory action by NaSIA. Similar concerns extend to some
secondary schools, where high class sizes, congested dormitories, lack of water, and poor sanitation remain issues yet still do not trigger enforcement measures.

However, private schools operating under similar conditions may face regulatory action, including refusal of a licence, raising concerns about partiality, unequal application of standards, and a perceived conflict of interest within the current governance arrangement.

Section 89 (3) also raises a fundamental question: how can the Minister, who is directly responsible for providing quality public schools, be the same authority empowered to prescribe disciplinary measures for institutions that fail to provide quality public and private schools?

A well-functioning National Schools Inspectorate requires governance that protects its independence and ensures that regulatory decisions are based on evidence, without any possibility of external influence.

Lessons from international practice

International best practice shows that strong inspectorates are typically designed to be structurally independent, professionally insulated, and protected from Executive influence to maintain public confidence in the fairness of regulatory decisions.

Several jurisdictions have adopted governance models that differ significantly from Ghana’s current arrangements, and have made significant impacts on standards regulation. Examples include the United
Kingdom’s Office for Standards in Education, Children Services and Skills (Ofsted); New Zealand’s Education Review Office (ERO); and the Netherlands’ Inspectorate of Education.

While each operates within its own constitutional context, Ofsted and New Zealand’s ERO offer particularly relevant lessons for Ghana.

The UK’s Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills

The United Kingdom’s Ofsted is widely regarded as one of the most structurally independent school inspectorates globally. It operates as a non-ministerial department, meaning it does not sit under the Department for Education and does not report to the Secretary of State for Education. Instead, it reports directly to Parliament.

This governance model ensures that:
a. Inspection judgements cannot be altered by the Secretary of State for Education, nor can he/she intervene in individual inspection outcomes or enforcement actions.
b. Regulatory decisions are made independently of political considerations or influence.
c. The Chief Inspector is appointed through a transparent public appointments process with the formal appointment made by the Crown and is accountable to Parliament, not the Executive.
d. Ofsted is accountable to the public through the Education Select Committee in Parliament. His Majesty’s Chief Inspector appears before the cross-party group of Parliamentarians regularly to defend Ofsted’s performance, strategy and evidence emerging from inspections.

This structure protects Ofsted’s operational independence and strengthens public trust in the credibility of its judgements.

The separation between the inspectorate and the Department for Education is deliberate, as it avoids both actual and perceived conflicts of interest and ensures that the body responsible for holding schools to account is not influenced by the same Executive responsible for running them.

New Zealand’s Education Review Office

New Zealand’s (ERO) provides a further model of inspectorate independence, combining strong autonomy with a degree of Executive accountability.

It operates as a stand-alone government department, separate from the Ministry of Education, and is structured to protect its independence while remaining accountable to the Minister for Education.

Though accountable to the Minister for Education, the Chief Review Officer who heads the ERO is appointed by the Public Service Commission rather than the Minister for Education or the Prime Minister.

The ERO’s statutory mandate empowers it to independently evaluate the performance of all schools and early childhood services, and it has the authority to publish its reports without requiring ministerial approval.

This separation between quality delivery, which sits with the Ministry, and quality assurance, which is the responsibility of ERO, ensures that the body responsible for delivering educational outcomes does not influence the body responsible for evaluating them As a result, the risk of political interference is significantly reduced, transparency is enhanced, and public confidence in the credibility of inspection findings is strengthened.

Conclusion

As an accountability institution, NaSIA’s role is to enforce compliance and evaluate performance and hold schools, including government schools, to account; this requires a higher level of independence than is currently provided under Act 1023.

The Authority’s current governance structure does not meet the standard required of an independent, impartial inspectorate body. Strengthening NaSIA’s governance autonomy and clarifying its enforcement powers will support a more credible and effective national quality assurance system

Policy Recommendations
1. The Ministry of Education should amend the Education Regulatory Bodies Act, 2020 (Act 1023 to reposition NaSIA as a non-ministerial department reporting directly to Parliament. This would mirror the structural separation seen in Ofsted (ensuring that the body responsible for evaluating school quality is not situated within the same Ministry responsible for delivering education services).
2. The Ministry of Education should amend Sections 89 (3) and 99 of Act 1023 to eliminate the requirement for NaSIA to consult the Minister before making certain regulatory decisions.
3. The NaSIA Board should be restructured to include a broader range of independent professionals. Executive representation should be reduced to only the Inspector General of Schools, for policy alignment. Independent Board appointments should be made by the Public Services Commission to ensure members are education sector experts selected for their expertise rather than political affiliation, while maintaining stakeholder representation from private schools, Teacher Unions, and the West African Examinations Council.

About the Author

This Policy Brief is authored by Elizabeth Dansoa Osei [B A Political Science with Philosophy (University of Ghana), Master of Public Policy (University of Oxford)], a Fellow with Africa Education Watch. She is a Public Policy Researcher and education policy specialist with a focus on equity, inclusion and systemic reform in African education systems, working with the Office for Standards in Education in the United Kingdom.
Email: oseielizabethdansoa@gmail.com

About Eduwatch
The Education Alert Policy Brief is a monthly publication by Eduwatch, an Education Policy Research and Advocacy Organisation working to promote quality, inclusive education policy management and reform by drawing on cross-cultural, transnational and international comparative perspectives across Africa
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