The International Monetary Fund has stated that the significant reform efforts by the government over the past decade have not yet translated into improved State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) financial performance, pointing to persistent structural weaknesses.

According to the Fund, the energy and commodity-sector SOEs remain the principal sources of financial strain, with arrears accumulation, liquidity constraints, and non-cost reflective tariffs contributing to ongoing fiscal pressures.

In its Technical Assistance Report on Ghana titled “Advancing SOE Fiscal Risks Management, Financial Oversight, Governance and Investment Implementation", the Bretton Woods institution said while SOE revenues increased markedly in absolute terms – from GH¢19 billion (2015) to GH¢133 billion (2024) - this has not resulted in improved overall SOE performance.

“Despite many entities operating profitably or around break-even point, a few large SOEs continue to drive the portfolio into net losses, which fluctuated around 1.0% of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] between 2016 and 2024. Part of this is due to financing costs of foreign currency denominated debts”.

It explained that this trend highlights a disconnect between reform progress and lack of tangible performance gains, as underlying constraints from quasi-fiscal activities and weak enforcement of hard budget constraints, remain largely unaddressed.

It welcomed the increased financial oversight role and the strengthened fiscal risk assessments of the Ministry of Finance [MOF].

At the same time, it said challenges remain with timeliness, data completeness, and integration of the fiscal risks assessment processes.

The MOF has two parallel fiscal risks reports – the Fiscal Risk Statement (FRS) and the SOE Fiscal Risk Report, which provide complementary but sometimes duplicative analyses, with the latter suffering from significant data lags and lack of focus on macro-critical enterprises.

The fiscal risk assessment is also complicated by the lack of information on quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) carried out by SOEs, obscuring the key factor of their persistent losses and the true fiscal cost of SOE operations”, it mentioned.

The IMF added that institutional responsibilities for SOE financial oversight are split between the MOF and State Interest and Governance Authority [SIGA], resulting in overlapping functions and fragmented reporting, which reduce efficiency and the effectiveness of fiscal risk management.

In 2019, the government created SIGA, marking a significant shift toward centralized and professional state ownership, with the authority working in concert with line ministries to expand the use of performance contracts and regular evaluations.

Ownership and Governance

On the ownership and governance aspects, the Fund reiterated that Ghana has made notable progress with the establishment of the legislative framework, but implementation gaps persist.

It argued that the Board and CEO appointments remain highly politicised, with active politicians and high-level officials occupying many board seats, undermining boards’ independence and professionalism.

It also expressed worry about compliance with reporting, audit, and performance contracting requirements, which it described as uneven among SOEs, with significant irregularities noted by the Auditor General in procurement, financial management, and audit follow-up.

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