From the standpoint of criminological thought, I believe that voluntary compliance, deterrence, and legitimacy of state institutions are three crucial concepts that deserve serious attention in addressing electoral violence. A caveat is necessary here: these are not neatly distinct concepts, but overlapping and interdependent ideas.

In criminology, it has long been established that the most effective form of law-abiding behaviour is voluntary compliance—not deterrence, despite its varied forms.

This insight first emerged in tax law but holds much broader relevance for law and order. While no society can achieve absolute voluntary compliance, it remains a foundational pillar of peace and security. Crucially, it is not automatic. It is cultivated over time through deliberate policies and socialisation. Unfortunately, in current discussions on electoral violence, this element is often ignored. Instead, consistent with global trends of penal populism, the focus tends to be on punitive measures and deterrence.

This is where voluntary compliance connects directly with legitimacy. In its most basic form, Tom Tyler, in his seminal work Why People Obey the Law, argues that the legitimacy of state institutions is central to fostering voluntary compliance. Citizens are more likely to obey the law not because of fear of punishment, but because they believe in the fairness and moral authority of the institutions enforcing it. Tyler also emphasises the role of personal morality in reinforcing law-abiding behaviour.

In practical terms, legitimacy rests on procedural justice—the degree of trust and confidence people place in institutions based on how they are treated and how decisions are made. Building on Tyler, Bottoms and Tankebe (among other things) highlight that legitimacy is dynamic and dialogic: it depends on continuous engagement between the state and citizens. It is enhanced when people are treated with dignity and respect, when processes are perceived as fair and transparent, and when citizens are given opportunities to voice their views. These factors are essential for fostering compliance and cooperation.

That said, deterrence still has a role—particularly in the short to medium term. Both general and focused deterrence are needed, built on the classic principles of certainty of arrest, swiftness of punishment, and proportional severity. Deterrence alone cannot sustain order, but it adds an important layer of immediate protection against electoral violence.

Many proposed solutions to electoral violence in Ghana have been visionary but have struggled to gain adequate traction in practice. I contend that meaningful progress will come from combining voluntary compliance, legitimacy, and deterrence—supplemented by insights from other disciplines. This integrated approach will not yield instant results, but gradually, it can help dismantle the entrenched culture of electoral violence that has taken root in our political life.

If we are serious about peace and democratic stability, we must look beyond punitive instincts and invest in building institutions that citizens trust, respect, and willingly obey.

Written by Emmanuel Sowatey

Email: emmanuel.sowatey@gmail.com.