In a world obsessed with appearances, we often judge change by the vessel that delivers it rather than the substance it carries. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in West Africa today.

As Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger chart a new political course through military-led governments, international condemnation has been swift. Coups, after all, are undesirable vessels. Yet, fixating solely on the vessel risks missing the more consequential question: what exactly are these governments brewing?

The case of Burkina Faso under President Ibrahim Traoré is instructive. Traoré's ascent to power via a coup naturally invites criticism, especially from those who see democracy as sacred, irrespective of its outcomes. But if we look beyond the vessel—the coup—and instead savour the tea—the substance of governance—we find a compelling story of transformation that challenges the old colonial and neo-colonial order.

In recent months, Burkina Faso has taken decisive steps toward economic sovereignty. Traoré has established the country's first national central bank, signalling a bold break from the CFA franc system that kept West African economies tethered to France long after political independence.

There are even discussions about creating a resource-backed currency anchored in Burkina Faso's abundant gold, uranium, and agricultural wealth. Though logistical hurdles abound, the symbolism and ambition are undeniable: Burkina Faso is striving to reclaim the power to chart its own economic destiny.

At the same time, Traoré's government has championed local industry. Instead of importing textiles for school, police, and military uniforms, Burkina Faso has shifted production to local factories, reviving its once-thriving cotton sector and creating jobs. These moves are not mere populist gestures; they represent practical economic nationalism grounded in empowerment and self-sufficiency.

Meanwhile, on the regional front, Burkina Faso has joined forces with Mali and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) after withdrawing from ECOWAS. Far from a reckless geopolitical adventure, the AES responds to years of frustration with regional and Western interventions that failed to stem terrorism or foster development. AES countries are working toward coordinated security policies, intelligence-sharing, and even economic integration through a common currency and passport. Sahelian nations are taking collective ownership of their security and economic futures for the first time in decades.

Yet these substantive shifts have been overshadowed by the focus on the "cup" rather than the "tea." Because Traoré and his peers came to power through coups, many in the international community, including ECOWAS, refuse to acknowledge the tangible progress underway. This "procedural fundamentalism," where elections are celebrated regardless of their outcomes and coups are condemned irrespective of their motives or results, reveals a profound misunderstanding of democracy's purpose.

Consider the contrasting case of Alpha Condé in Guinea and Alassane Ouattara in Ivory Coast. Both leaders were elected through ostensibly democratic processes, yet each manipulated constitutional frameworks to prolong their rule. Condé's third term bid in Guinea triggered mass protests and violent crackdowns, ultimately leading to his overthrow. Ouattara's controversial third-term election in Ivory Coast deepened political tensions and polarised the nation. And yet, because they emerged from electoral processes, however flawed, international institutions tolerated their leadership—even celebrated.

Nor are they alone. In Nigeria, Ahmed Bola Tinubu "won" one of the most controversial elections in recent history, with widespread allegations of irregularities and voter suppression. Yet he not only assumed office but was later made Chairman of ECOWAS—a stark reminder that questionable electoral legitimacy does not necessarily diminish international recognition.
Likewise, in Togo, Faure Gnassingbé has been in power for two decades after succeeding his father, who ruled for almost four decades. Despite the dynastic hold on power, Faure continues to be celebrated because he has "won" successive elections, no matter how deeply flawed those elections may be.

Here lies the double tragedy. In the first scenario, where real, people-centred reforms occur under "illegitimate" military regimes, we reject the tea because we dislike the cup. In the second scenario, where electoral leaders violate the spirit of democracy and perpetuate suffering, we celebrate the cup even though it contains nothing nourishing.

Institutions like ECOWAS have largely mirrored this bias. They have condemned the AES states for their unconstitutional ascensions but said little about the constitutional manipulations and governance failures that fueled widespread anger and opened the door to military interventions in the first place. Their loyalty seems more to procedure than to the people whom democratic processes are meant to serve.

But the people of Burkina Faso have spoken—and continue to speak—with their support. Traoré has survived multiple coup attempts not because he has an iron grip on power but because he still enjoys a remarkable level of popular legitimacy.

Contrast this with leaders like Ouattara, Condé, Tinubu, or Gnassingbé, whose governments faced mass opposition, protests, and simmering instability. In Traoré’s Burkina Faso, public sentiment has so far remained strongly nationalistic, development-oriented, and supportive of sovereignty efforts.

This is not to romanticise military rule or suggest that Traoré is above reproach. Concerns about democratic governance, human rights, and institutional checks must not be abandoned. However, nuance is essential. Democratic legitimacy must be evaluated not merely by how a government is formed but by what it delivers—especially in contexts where the existing "democratic" regimes have failed to deliver even the most basic public goods: security, opportunity, and dignity.

If we are to be intellectually honest, the West African experience should provoke a fundamental rethink. For too long, elections have been fetishised as ends in themselves, rather than means to ensure accountable, people-centred governance. Meanwhile, the very societies that hold free and fair elections have at times produced leaders whose actions erode the institutions they were elected to uphold.

Ghana's 2024 elections offered a reminder of these tensions. Despite another successful vote, the country witnessed disturbing levels of post-election violence—a symptom of deeper disillusionment with the political class. Ghana’s democracy survived, but only just. The "tea" of governance—the lived experiences of citizens—was growing increasingly bitter, even as the "cup" of elections remained intact.

Therefore, as we reflect on the Sahel’s political reconfigurations, we must resist lazy binaries of elected equals good, coup equals bad. We must resist the urge to throw away the tea simply because we dislike the cup.

Today, Burkina Faso represents one of Africa's boldest experiments in reclaiming sovereignty, dignity, and development from the failed prescriptions of the past. It is messy and imperfect, but it is also filled with a vibrancy and agency that cannot be denied.

The international community and Africans must learn to distinguish between form and substance, and between optics and outcomes. The true test of leadership should not be merely how a leader comes to power, but what they do with it once they have it.

As Burkina Faso strives to redefine its future, let us have the courage to savour the tea—to support positive transformations wherever they arise—even if the cup offends our delicate sensibilities. In the end, it is not the cup that nourishes. It is the tea. And if the tea is good, then it deserves to be savoured.

---

Dr Muhammad Dan Suleiman is the Founding Director of the Centre for Alternative Politics & Security West Africa (www.caps-wa.org). He is an adjunct research fellow at Curtin University’s Centre for Australia-Africa Relations, Australia. Muhammad researches, speaks, and writes on West African politics and security and advocates for alternative politics in Africa. Email: mld.suleiman@gmail.com