In recent years, Ghana has experienced recurring fire outbreaks that have destroyed homes, businesses, markets and livelihoods. Data from the Ghana National Fire Service show that 3,595 fire incidents were recorded nationwide between January and June 2025, with domestic fires accounting for 1,320 cases, the largest category.

 Electrical fires accounted for another 434 incidents. The estimated value of property damaged during the period was GH¢188.4 million (Nudzi, 2025). The problem continued throughout the year.

 In the Ashanti Region alone, the Ghana National Fire Service recorded 1,023 fire incidents in 2025, including 416 domestic and 125 electrical fires. Although total incidents declined from 2024, fire-related deaths increased from nine to twelve (Mensah, 2026).

These incidents remind us that protecting homes requires more than responding after disaster strikes. Early detection, reliable communication and timely access to information can make an important difference.

As Ghana's digital transformation continues, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies including connected smoke detectors, cameras, motion sensors, smart locks, alarms and other monitoring devices could increasingly become part of how households detect and respond to emergencies.

But this opportunity presents another challenge: What if the technologies we depend on to protect our homes are themselves insecure? This question is at the heart of an important emerging area of research on the security and privacy of smart home systems during crises and emergencies.

Thomas Synaepa-Addison and Jess Kropczynski of the University of Cincinnati examined this problem in their 2026 paper, Security and Privacy in Smart Home Systems During Crises and Emergencies: A Systematic Literature Review, presented at the International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM).

The research brings together existing studies to understand the security vulnerabilities and privacy risks associated with smart homes during crises, with particular attention to fires and burglaries (Synaepa-Addison & Kropczynski, 2026).

The significance of the study lies in the context in which it asks the cybersecurity question. A smart lock may simply control access to a house during an ordinary day. During a fire, however, that same device could become part of an evacuation pathway. A security camera ordinarily monitors a property.

During a burglary, the information it collects may become essential for understanding an intrusion. Similarly, an occupancy sensor may ordinarily control lighting or energy consumption, but during an emergency, information about whether someone remains inside a building could become much more important.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether smart homes are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Synaepa-Addison and Kropczynski (2026) move the discussion toward a more consequential question: Can smart homes remain secure, private and resilient when occupants are facing an actual crisis?

Their systematic review identifies challenges involving data management, technical and communication vulnerabilities, system and architectural weaknesses, and human factors. These issues demonstrate that smart-home security is not a problem that can be solved through one technology alone.

Among the most important concerns is data. A connected home can generate enormous amounts of information about the people living inside it. Cameras can reveal who is present. Motion sensors can identify movement. Smart locks may record when people enter and leave. Other connected devices can collectively reveal household routines and behaviors. Synaepa-Addison and

Kropczynski (2026) found data-management risks to be especially prominent in the literature they reviewed. This finding is consistent with the broader smart-home research. Buil-Gil et al. (2023), after reviewing 63 studies, identified privacy intrusion as the most frequently discussed digital harm associated with smart-home devices, alongside threats such as hacking, malware, denial-of-service attacks and unauthorized access.

During an emergency, however, privacy becomes more complicated. Imagine firefighters responding to a burning smart home. Information from occupancy sensors or other connected technologies could potentially help establish whether people remain inside.

But who should be allowed to access such information? For how long? Who determines that the emergency is genuine? And should access automatically disappear after the emergency? The goal should not be to choose between privacy and safety. The challenge is to design systems that can provide necessary information during genuine emergencies without turning temporary access into permanent surveillance.

Recent developments in the United States demonstrate why this conversation is necessary. In June 2026, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission recalled approximately 321,360 Wyze Solar Cam Pan security cameras because incorrect assembly instructions could lead consumers to puncture the lithium-ion battery casing.

The Commission reported 13 cases of overheating and six cases in which cameras exploded and caught fire, including six reports of minor burns (U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission [CPSC], 2026). There is a striking irony here: a device purchased to improve home security could itself become a fire hazard. Cybersecurity creates another concern.

 In June 2025, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned that criminals were exploiting IoT devices connected to home networks through the BADBOX 2.0 botnet. According to the FBI (2025), some devices had malicious software configured before consumers purchased them, while others could become infected during setup through applications containing backdoors.

These examples illustrate an important lesson: smart-home risk does not necessarily begin when the consumer switches on the device. Sometimes it begins much earlier.

This is where procurement and supply-chain management becomes particularly important. A consumer sees a finished security camera, smoke detector or smart lock.

Behind that product, however, may be component suppliers, manufacturers, software developers, cloud-service providers, distributors, retailers and telecommunications providers. Boyson et al. (2022), in Defending Digital Supply Chains: Evidence from a Decade-Long Research Program, position Cyber-Supply Chain Risk Management at the intersection of cybersecurity, supply-chain management and enterprise risk management. Their work demonstrates why cybersecurity cannot be separated from the networks of organizations involved in developing and delivering digital products.

 Boyens et al. (2021), through the National Institute of Standards and Technology's work on cyber-supply-chain risk management, similarly emphasize the importance of identifying and managing cybersecurity risks arising from suppliers and external technology dependencies.

 The implications for smart homes are significant. If a manufacturer stops issuing security updates, the homeowner inherits that risk. If an inexpensive device contains vulnerable software, the consumer inherits that risk.

 If sensitive household data passes through third-party services with weak privacy protections, the homeowner inherits that risk. And, as the FBI's BADBOX warning demonstrates, if a product is compromised before purchase, the consumer may unknowingly procure the cyber threat together with the device (FBI, 2025). Procurement decisions are therefore becoming cybersecurity decisions.

Ghana already has research demonstrating why this wider cybersecurity problem deserves attention.  Owusu  et  al.  (2025),  in  Mitigating  Cyber  Threats:  Strategies  for  Securing

Communication Systems in Ghana, interviewed 150 industry experts, government officials and cybersecurity professionals. Participants identified phishing, malware, ransomware, insider threats, human error and inadequate cybersecurity training among important threats to Ghana's communication systems.

The researchers recommend stronger cybersecurity education, investment in technological infrastructure, artificial intelligence and machine learning, stronger policies, continuous monitoring, real-time incident response and greater collaboration between the public and private sectors.

These recommendations provide an important foundation, but Ghana's cybersecurity conversation must increasingly extend from national communication systems and organizations into the connected home.

As IoT devices become more affordable and accessible, Ghana has an opportunity to address security and privacy before insecure smart technologies become deeply embedded in households.

Synaepa-Addison and Kropczynski (2026) found several approaches being proposed to secure smart homes, including cryptographic protections, stronger authentication, resilient architectures and AI- and machine-learning-based security mechanisms.

The central lesson from Synaepa-Addison and Kropczynski's (2026) systematic review is that smart-home security must be designed and evaluated specifically for crisis conditions, not only ordinary use. Based on the findings of the SLR and the supporting research, Ghana can begin taking several important steps.

A.            Security and privacy should be built into smart technologies from the beginning: Strong authentication, encrypted communication, secure configurations and reliable software updates should become basic expectations.

B.            Critical smart-home systems should be resilient: A safety function should not unnecessarily become useless simply because internet connectivity or a cloud service disappears.

C.            Users must remain meaningfully in control: Emergency technologies should reduce rather than increase the cognitive burden on people experiencing stressful situations.

D.            Procurement must become part of cybersecurity governance: Government institutions, property developers, businesses and consumers purchasing connected technologies should consider security-update commitments, manufacturer reputation, vulnerability management, data practices, product support and third-party dependencies alongside price and functionality.

E.            Suppliers should be accountable throughout the product lifecycle: The lowest purchase price does not necessarily represent the lowest total risk. A cheap connected device that receives no security updates may ultimately create greater costs through data breaches, replacement, system failure or exposure to cyberattack.

For procurement and supply-chain professionals, this means cybersecurity must increasingly become part of how connected technologies are specified, sourced, evaluated and managed throughout their lifecycle. For Ghana, it presents an opportunity.

As connected homes develop, the country can promote technologies that are not merely smart, affordable and convenient, but also secure, resilient and responsibly sourced. A truly emergency-ready smart home should not simply be intelligent enough to detect a fire or burglary.

 It must be secure enough to withstand attack, resilient enough to maintain critical functions, private enough to protect the people inside, and simple enough to keep humans meaningfully in control when every second matters. That is what should define a truly smart and truly safe home.